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GERRYMANDERING METRICS:
HOW TO MEASURE? WHAT’S THE BASELINE?
MOON DUCHIN
1. What is a districting plan?
For the purposes of this brief discussion, I need to begin by specifying redistricting as a math problem
in some way; that is, by formalizing a districting plan as an appropriate kind of mathematical object. I’ll
propose a way to do this that is completely uncontroversial: start with the smallest units of population that
are to be the building blocks of a plan—these might be units given by the Census, like blocks, block groups,
or tracts, or they might be units given by the state, like precincts or wards.1 Represent those population
units as nodes or vertices in a graph, and connect two of them if the units are geographically adjacent.
For instance, here is a map of Wisconsin, and with it I have drawn a graph of its 1,409 census tracts.
You certainly can’t see all the ones in Milwaukee by looking at this picture, because the graph is too dense
there, which illustrates that plotting the graph in this way (with the vertices at the centers of the tracts)
also shows you where the population is clustered.
Figure 1. Wisconsin with the census-tract graph overlaid, and with the graph shown separately.
Armed with this, we can say that a (contiguous) districting plan is a partition of the vertices in the graph of
a state’s population into some number of subsets called districts, such that each district induces a connected
subgraph.2 For instance, Wisconsin currently has eight congressional districts and 99 state assembly districts,
so if they were made from census-tract units, then the former districts would have 100-200 nodes each while
the latter would have only 10-20 nodes.3
Our goal when we redistrict is to find a partition that meets a list of criteria. Some of those are universal
and apply to the whole country, like having nearly equal populations in the districts and complying with
the federal Voting Rights Act, and some are specified by states, such as guidance about shapes of districts
or about how much to allow the splitting of counties and cities. Part of what makes redistricting so hard is
that many of these rules are vague, and they often represent conflicting priorities.
The rest of this note will be devoted to outlining three intellectually distinct but not mutually exclusive
strategies for measuring partisan gerrymandering. The first two are only suited for partisan gerrymandering,
but the third is more flexible and can be used for other kinds of measurements of a plan, like racial bias
or competitiveness. For each approach we should track the norm and the baseline: how does the metric
correspond to a notion of fairness? and what’s the basis of comparison against which a plan is assessed?
1A districting plan normally won’t go below the census block level, because then population needs to be estimated. The
units in which the election outcomes are recorded are called VTDs, or voting tabulation districts, which typically correspond
to precincts or wards. These are natural units to build a plan from if you want to study its partisan properties.
2It is generally reasonable to also require that no district is wholly surrounded by another district.
3That is, if the districts were made out of whole tracts. In fact, they are typically made out of finer pieces, like precincts.
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2. Partisan symmetry
Partisan symmetry is a principle for districting plans that has been articulated and championed by Gary
King, Bernie Grofman, Andrew Gelman, and several other prominent scholars. (See [2] and its references.)
At its heart is a certain normative principle (or statement of how fair plans should behave): how one party
performs with a certain vote share should be handled symmetrically if the other party received the same
vote share. That is, if Democrats got 60% of the vote and, with that, won 65% of the seats in the election,
then if Republicans had earned 60% of the vote, they too should have received 65% of the seats.
To visualize this, let’s build a seats-votes plot. On the x-axis we’ll record V , the proportion of votes won
by party A. On the y-axis will be S, the proportion of seats in the electoral body won by A. So a single
statewide election is represented by one point on this grid; for instance (V, S) = (.6, .65).
The problem is that a single data point does not tell you enough to understand the properties of the
districting plan as a plan. A standard way to extend this point to a curve is to use the model called uniform
partisan swing: look at the results district by district, and add/subtract the same number of percentage
points to party A’s vote share in each district. As you keep adding to A’s vote share, you eventually push
the share past 50% in some districts, causing those districts to flip their winner from B to A. And as you
subtract, you eventually push districts towards B. Thus this method creates a curve that is step-shaped,
showing a monotonic increase in the proportion of seats for A as the proportion of votes for A rises.
Figure 2. Seats-votes curves generated by uniform partisan swing from the Minnesota and
Ohio congressional elections in 2016, both presented from the Republican point of view.
The actual election outcomes from which the curves were derived are (0.48, 0.38) for MN
and (0.58, 0.75) for OH.
In the figure, we see that the Minnesota election has a seats-votes curve that is very nearly symmetric
about the center point (.5, .5). On the other hand, Ohio’s curve is very far from symmetric. Rather, it looks
like Ohio Republicans can secure 75% of the congressional representation from just 50% of the vote, and
that just 42% of the vote is enough for them to take a majority of the congressional seats.
A partisan symmetry standard would judge a plan to be more gerrymandered for producing a more
asymmetrical seats-votes curve, flagging a plan if the asymmetry is sufficiently severe. There are many ways
that a mathematician could imagine using a bit of functional analysis to quantify the failure of symmetry,
but there are also a few elementary and easy-to-visualize scores: for instance, look at how far the curve is
from the center point (.5, .5), either in vertical displacement or in horizontal displacement, on reasoning that
any truly symmetric plan must award each party half the seats if the vote is split exactly evenly. Or compare
one party’s outcome with a given vote share to that for the other party if it had the same share.4
In the (substantial) literature on partisan symmetry scores, you will sometimes see the vertical displace-
ment called partisan bias (e.g., in [4]) and the horizontal displacement called the mean/median score.
4If the seats-votes curve is denoted f(V ), then this comparison amounts to P (V ) = |f(V )− [1− f(1− V )]|. It is natural,
for instance, to evaluate this at V = V0, the actual vote share in a given election, but most authors don’t commit to this.
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3. Efficiency gap
Efficiency gap is a quite different idea about measuring partisan skew, both in its conceptual framing and
in which plans it picks out as gerrymanders. However, it does have a whiff of symmetry about it: it begins
with the normative principle that a plan is fair if the two parties “waste” an equal number of votes. [4]
In order to parlay a certain given number of party-A voters into the maximum possible number of seats
for A, an extreme gerrymanderer would want to distribute A voters efficiently through the districts: you’d
win as many districts as you can by narrow margins, and you wouldn’t put any of your voters at all in
the districts won by the other side, because they’re not contributing towards your representation there. By
this logic, there are two ways for a party to waste votes. On one hand, votes are wasted where there is an
unnecessarily high winning margin—for this model, say every vote over 50% is wasted. On the other hand,
all losing votes are wasted votes. Efficiency gap is the quantity given by the following simple expression:
just add up the statewide wasted votes for party A by summing over districts, subtract the statewide wasted
votes for party B, and divide by the total number of votes in the state. Let’s call this number EG. Note
that it is a signed score, and that −.5 ≤ EG ≤ .5 by construction.5 By the logic of the definition, a totally
fair plan would have EG = 0. This score was first devised by political scientist Eric McGhee and was made
into the centerpiece of a multi-pronged legal test by McGhee and law professor Nick Stephanopoulos in their
influential 2015 paper. For legislative races, they propose |EG| = .08 as the threshold, past which a plan
would be presumptively unconstitutional.
V (votes)
S (seats) |EG| ≤ .08
(.65, .65)
EG = .15
Figure 3. The region containing (S, V ) outcomes that pass the EG test is shown in green.
The dashed line is direct proportionality (S = V ).
Happily, this test is very easily represented on a seats-votes plot such as we introduced in the previous
section.6 The permissibility zone (derived from the EG formula and shown in Figure 3) turns out to be a
strip of slope two in the seats-votes space; any election that produces an outcome falling outside this zone is
flagged as a gerrymander. That the slope is two means that a certain “seat bonus” is effectively prescribed
for the winning side: as the authors of the standard put it, “To produce partisan fairness, in the sense
of equal wasted votes for each party, the bonus should be a precisely twofold increase in seat share for a
given increase in vote share.” This has the funny property that elections that produce directly proportional
outcomes are often flagged as problematic.7 For instance, the point (.65, .65) marked in the figure, where a
party has earned 65% of the vote and converted it to 65% of the seats, is seen as a gerrymander in favor
of the other side! Quantitatively, that’s because this case has EG = .15, far larger than the threshold.
Conceptually, it’s because the party has received an inadequate seat bonus by the lights of the efficiency gap.
5This is true because the total wasted votes in the state, and indeed in each district, add up to half of the votes cast.
6Note that throughout this section we are leaning on the simplifying assumptions that all districts have equal turnout, there
are only two parties, and all races are contested by both sides. These are varyingly realistic assumptions.
7As mentioned above, EG is proposed as one part of a multi-pronged legal test, so high EG alone wouldn’t doom a plan.
But it is obviously still relevant to understand the systematic features of the score and the norms behind its construction.
4 MOON DUCHIN
4. Sampling
Finally, I want to sketch a new approach to redistricting analysis that has started to crystallize only in
the last five or so years. It draws on a very well-established random walk sampling theory whose growth has
accelerated continuously since its early development in the 1940s.8 The scientific details for the application
to gerrymandering are still coalescing, but the idea is incredibly promising and has profound conceptual
advantages that should cause it to fare well in courts. This idea is to use algorithmic sampling to understand
the space of all possible districting plans for a given state.
Remember our goal: we seek to split up a large, finite graph into some number of districts. What you
see in this picture is a very small graph being split up into four districts, represented by the different colors.
First, we constrain the search space with requirements for valid plans, such as contiguity of the pieces,
compactness of their shapes, keeping population deviation under 1%, maintaining the current number of
majority-minority districts, and so on. (This will depend on the laws in place in the state we are studying.9)
A sampling algorithm takes a random walk around the space of all valid partitions: starting with a particular
districting plan, flip units from district to district, thousands, millions, billions, or trillions of times.
Figure 4. This figure shows a tiny section of a search space of districting plans. Two plans
are adjacent here if a simple flip of a node from one district to another takes you from one
plan to the other. For instance, toggling one node between purple and black flips between
plan B to plan C.
Searching in in this way, such as with a leading method called Markov chain Monte Carlo, or MCMC, you
can sample many thousands of maps from the chains produced by random flips. Each one is a possible way
that you could have drawn the district lines. Call this big collection of maps your ensemble of districting
plans.
What can you do with a large and diverse ensemble of plans? This finally gives us a good way to address
the baseline problem that always looms over attempts to adjudicate gerrymandering. That is, it gives us
a tool we can use to decide whether plans are skewed relative to other possible plans with the same raw
materials. The norm undergirding the sampling standard is that districting plans should be constructed as
though just by the stated principles.
The computer sampling methods could even be used to craft a new legal framework: Extreme outliers are
impermissible. (See Figure 5.) How extreme? That would require some time and experience to determine,
8Diaconis’s excellent survey [1] reviews successful applications of MCMC in chemistry, physics, biology, statistics, group
theory, and theoretical computer science.
9The process of interpreting and operationalizing rules to create scores certainly bears scrutiny. A successful implementation
will have to demonstrate robustness of outcomes across choices made when scoring.
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just as population deviation standards have taken some time to stabilize numerically in response to the
corresponding legal framework One person, one vote.
Figure 5. On this plot, the x-axis is the number of seats won by Republicans out of 99 in
the Wisconsin State Assembly, and the y-axis shows how often each outcome occurred in
the ensemble of 19,184 districting plans generated by the MCMC algorithm from [3]. Given
the actual vote pattern in the 2012 election, the plans could have produced a number of
Republican seats anywhere from 49 to 61, with 55 seats being the most frequent outcome.
The legislature’s plan (“Act 43”) in fact produced 60 seats for Republicans, making it more
extreme than 99.5% of alternatives.
The great strength of this method is that it is sensitive to the particularities, legal and demographic, of
each state that it is used to analyze. If a state has specific rules in its constitution or in state law—examples
include North Carolina’s “whole county provision,” Wisconsin’s quirky rules for district contiguity, Arizona’s
preference for competitive races, incumbent protection in Kansas, Colorado’s guidance to minimize the sum
of the district perimeters—the sampling can be carried out subject to those constraints or priorities. And
just as importantly, it addresses a major critique that can be leveled at both of the previous approaches: why
is it reasonable to prefer seats-votes symmetry, or to aim at equal vote wastage, when populations themselves
are clustered in highly asymmetrical ways? For instance, imagine a state in which every household has 3
Republicans and 2 Democrats. (Of course this is highly unrealistic, but it’s an extreme case of a state with
a very uniform distribution of partisan preferences.) Then no matter where you draw the lines, every single
district will be 60% Republican, which means Rs win 100% of the seats, corresponding to the point (.6, 1) on
the seats-votes plot. One can easily verify that there is literally no plan at all that doesn’t have a sky-high
partisan bias10 or that gets the efficiency gap below .3. On the other hand, the sampling method will reveal
an ensemble in which all plans are made up of 60–40 districts, and thus will show a particular plan with
that composition to be completely typical and therefore permissible along partisan lines. It seems intuitively
unreasonable for 60% of the votes to earn all of the seats, but this method reveals that the political geography
of this state demands it.
5. Summary
As mentioned earlier, these three approaches can be used in concert. For instance, one can use any
evaluation axis with a sampling ensemble, say efficiency gap (or mean-median score) instead of partisan
outcome. So you can mix and match these approaches. Nonetheless, each has a different normative principle
at its core and they would produce quite different redistricting outcomes if they were to be adopted at the
center of a new legal framework. Let’s review some pros and cons.
10In the simple model, the seats-votes curve is a step function with a big jump at V = 1/2. For more granularity, you could
instead imagine a map in which one district has 39% D and all others have percentages clustered around 41%, also producing
a high partisan bias score for no very damning reason. Compare MN-2016 from Figure 2.
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For partisan symmetry, it is really easy to make the case for fairness: it sounds eminently reasonable
that the two parties should be treated the same by the system. Partisan symmetry uses up-to-date statistics
and political science and has a lot of professional consensus behind it. On the other hand, it has been
critiqued by the court as too reliant on speculation and counterfactuals, mainly because of how it arrives at
conclusions on how a plan would have performed at different vote levels.11 And it does not center on the
question of how much advantage the line drawers have squeezed from their power, because it lacks a baseline
of how much symmetry a politically neutral agent could reasonably be expected to produce, or even an agent
who took symmetry as a goal. Crucially, it is not at all clear that it is easy or even feasible to draw a map
that will maintain partisan symmetry across several elections in a Census cycle.
An interesting and attractive feature of efficiency gap is that it seems to derive, rather than prescribe,
a permissible range in that seats/votes plot. It offers a single score and a standard threshold, and it is
relatively easy to run.12 The creators of the EG standard did about the best possible job of creating what
the courts seemed to be demanding: a single judicially manageable indicator of partisan gerrymandering. The
problem is that gerrymandering is a fundamentally multi-dimensional problem, so it is manifestly impossible
to convert that into a single number without a loss of information that is bound to produce many false
positives or false negatives for gerrymandering. To illustrate the dimension issue, imagine that we are at
your house and you ask me where I live. It is impossible to reasonably communicate the location of my house
to you with a single number. If you let me give you two numbers, I can give you latitude and longitude, say,
but practically speaking just one number won’t do.
Finally I have described the sampling approach and outlier analysis, and I’ve argued that the strength
of this approach is that it is sensitive to not only the law, as we’ve seen, but also to the political geography of
each state—for instance, Wisconsin Democrats are densely arranged in Milwaukee proper, ringed by heavily
Republican suburbs, but in Alaska Dems are spread throughout the rural parts of the state—which might
have hard-to-measure effects on just how possible it is to split up the votes symmetrically or efficiently.
Outlier analysis doesn’t measure a districting plan against an all-purpose ideal, but against actual splittings
of the state, holding the distribution of votes constant. In the next ten years, I expect to see explosive
scientific progress on characterizing the geometry and topology of the space of districting plans, and on
understanding the sampling distributions produced by our algorithms.
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